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PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS - THE REQUIREMENT OF A
FULL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
By MICHAEL A. MILLEMANN*
The administration of state prisons traditionally has been con-
sidered an executive function lying beyond judicial scrutiny in all except
the most extreme cases of administrative abuse. The right of state
penal administrators to mete out punishment for inmate misconduct
has been regarded as plenary and, until recently, has gone virtually
unchallenged by the judiciary.' Federal courts in New York' and
Maryland 3 have recently critically re-examined the constitutional va-
lidity of summary punishment of prison inmates for alleged miscon-
duct and have reached conclusions which, to varying degrees, reject
the tradition of automatic judicial deference to decisions of prison
administrators. These decisions hold that prison administrators must
observe basic procedural requirements before imposing substantial
punishment upon inmates for infraction of prison rules. This article,
utilizing two of these recent decisions as models, analyzes the effects
of the imposition of a fourteenth amendment due process requirement
on the administration of prison discipline.4
I. THE FACTUAL SETTINGS
The facts of Sostre v. Rockefeller and Bundy v. Cannon are simi-
lar in that inmates of a state penal system were punished for alleged
misconduct by being transferred to maximum security quarters. In
both cases the decision to punish was made without there having been
an administrative hearing conducted according to procedures embody-
ing principles of due process. Since a basic understanding of the par-
ticularized facts in these cases is essential for an appreciation of the
extent of freedom at stake and the necessity for observing procedural
due process in the conduct of prison disciplinary proceedings, the facts
surrounding the cases are set forth in some detail below.
* Member, Maryland Bar; Reginald Heber Smith Fellow; Legal Education
Director of the Legal Aid Bureau of Maryland; B.A., 1966, Dartmouth College; J.D.,
1969, Georgetown University. The author is indebted to co-counsel in the cases of
Adams v. Cannon and Bundy v. Cannon [hereinafter referred to as Bundy v. Cannon],
Joseph Matera and Stephen Sachs, for their substantial assistance in developing many
of the thoughts expressed in this article. The author also wishes to express his
appreciation for the considerable assistance to the litigation of Bundy rendered by
the Prisoner Assistance Project, a legal assistance program staffed by students from
the University of Maryland and University of Baltimore law schools.
1. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
2. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971).
3. Bundy v. Cannon, Nos. 70-486-T, 70-1363-T (D. Md., Mar. 2, 1971) (citing
only to the interim opinion).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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A. Sostre v. Rockefeller
On March 18, 1968, Martin Sostre was sentenced to serve a
lengthy prison term in the New York correctional system. 5 As a
former inmate of that system, Sostre, an outspoken Black Muslim
and accomplished "jailhouse lawyer," had initiated federal civil rights
litigation which resulted in an expanded recognition and protection of
religious freedom for Black Muslims in jail and in an abolition of the
harshest conditions then existing in solitary confinement cells.' Thus,
Sostre was returning, on March 18, 1968, to a penal system which
would probably receive him with apprehension and some hostility.
This was, in fact, the response of the state correctional authori-
ties. Upon sentencing, Sostre was immediately conveyed to Attica
Prison (Attica, New York) where he was secluded overnight in an
uninhabited cell block. The next day he was summarily transferred
to Green Haven Prison (Green Haven, New York) where he was
held in solitary confinement. After several days in these restricted
quarters, he was released into Green Haven's general prison popula-
tion where he was entitled to the same privileges enjoyed by other
inmates.7 A few months later, however, Sostre was again transferred
to solitary confinement (described by prison officials as "punitive seg-
regation") where he remained for over one year. During this lengthy
period of confinement, Sostre remained in his cell for twenty-four
hours a day in almost complete isolation from other inmates.8 He was
placed on a restricted diet, permitted to shower and shave with hot
water only once weekly, refused permission to work, and denied other
important privileges afforded to other prisoners.9 In addition, he was
denied 124 and 1/3 days of "good time" credit while confined in these
quarters.1" This lengthy punitive confinement was justified by prison
officials on several grounds: (1) his refusal, despite warnings, to
discontinue rendering legal advice and assistance to fellow inmates ;"
(2) his statement in a letter to his sister that he would "be out
5. He was sentenced by the Supreme Court of New York, Erie County, to thirty
to forty years imprisonment for selling narcotics, to be followed by consecutive one-
year and thirty-day sentences for contempt of court. 312 F. Supp. at 866.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 866-67.
8. Id. at 868. Sostre refused a daily exercise privilege (one hour in a small
enclosed yard) since the granting of it would have been conditioned upon submission
to a daily "strip frisk" in which the person searched, after having been rendered
completely naked, is subjected to a rectal examination. For four of the thirteen
months of Sostre's confinement, there was one other inmate incarcerated in the same
group of cells.
9. Id. He was denied second portions of food and desserts, was refused access
to the prison library, and was not allowed to read newspapers, watch movies or par-
ticipate in educational and training programs.
10. Id. "Good time" is time credited to an inmate for good conduct and/or satis-
factory employment performance. It serves to advance the time of an inmate's parole
hearing and ultimate release by decreasing the amount of time left to serve. See
note 63 infra.
11. A search of Sostre's cell on June 25, 1968, disclosed a letter from a court to
another inmate (it was later shown that Sostre was translating this letter into Spanish
for the other inmate) and revealed that Sostre was lending legal materials to other
inmates. Id. at 867-69.
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soon";12 and (3) his refusal to answer questions about R.N.A. (Re-
public of New Africa), an organization referred to by him in a letter
to his attorney. 18
Not only was the punishment of Sostre severe; it was also sum-
mary. Prior to his punitive confinement, Sostre received neither writ-
ten notice of the charges against him nor an administrative hearing
to determine his guilt or innocence. Although he discussed his al-
legedly improper conduct with the warden, there was no record made
of these conversations; and the warden's decision to punish him was
not reduced to writing. Consequently, there existed no written record
of either the reasons for Sostre's punishment or the findings of fact
upon which it was based.' 4
After having been confined for one year under these conditions,
Sostre filed suit in federal court, alleging that such confinement was
unconstitutional and that, therefore, he was entitled to both damages
and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.15 He alleged,
inter alia, that his confinement in punitive segregation under the con-
ditions described 6 constituted such cruel and unusual punishment as
to have been proscribed by the eighth 7 and fourteenth' amendments
and that the failure to provide him with either notice of the charges
against him or an administrative hearing prior to punishment denied
12. The letter stated:
As for me, there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that I will be out soon,
either by having my appeal reversed in the courts or by being liberated by the
Universal Forces of Liberation. The fact that the militarists of this country are
being defeated in Viet Nam and are already engaged with an escalating rebellion
in this country by the oppressed Afro-American people and their white allies are
sure signs that the power structure is on its way out. They are now in their lastdays and soon they won't be able to oppress anybody because they themselves will
be before the People's courts to be punished for their crimes against humanity
as were the German war criminals at Nuremberg.
Id. at 867. All mail from Sostre to his friends, relatives and attorney was censored.
The warden of the institution excised all portions of correspondence to his attorney
which he believed were not directly related to Sostre's immediate case.
13. The warden of Green Haven Prison stated that his concern over the state-
ment in Sostre's letter to his sister prompted him to ask Sostre what he meant by a
reference to R.N.A. in the letter to his attorney. Id. at 867.
14. Id. at 868.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very person
who, under color of any statute .. . regulation [or] custom . ..of any State ...
subjects .. .any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights ...
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law [or] suit in equity. .. ." Because, unlike the situation in which a person
is seeking a writ of habeas corpus, there is no requirement that one suing pursuant
to section 1983 must exhaust state remedies [Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)], this statute has
become a well utilized vehicle for contesting the constitutionality of the treatment
of inmates by prison administrators. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1967) ; Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1967) ; Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ; Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 227, 255 (1970).
16. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides, in part, that "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, . . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This prohibition is
made applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
18. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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him his liberty in a manner which was contrary to due process of law
in violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 9
On July 2, 1969, Judge Constance Baker Motley issued a tempo-
rary restraining order requiring prison officials to release Sostre from
solitary confinement and to return him to the general prison popula-
tion pending a hearing and final decision on his suit.2" After a sub-
sequent full evidentiary hearing, Judge Motley rendered a wide-sweep-
ing decision in which she held the treatment of Sostre by prison
officials to have been unconstitutional and in which she found that
Sostre was punished, not because of a serious or even a minor infrac-
tion of the prison rules, but in fact because of "his legal and Black
Muslim activities during his 1952-1964 incarceration, because of his
threat to file a law suit against the Warden to secure his right to un-
restricted correspondence with his attorney and to aid his codefendant
. .. and because he is, unquestionably, a black militant who persists
in writing and expressing his militant and radical ideas in prison." 21
Specifically, Judge Motley held that Sostre's treatment violated the
Constitution because, inter alia,22 he had been confined in punitive
segregation without first being given (1) notice (designating the
prison rule violated) of the charges against him; (2) a hearing before
an impartial official at which he was allowed to be represented by
counsel or by a counsel-substitute, to cross-examine his accusers and
to call witnesses in rebuttal; and (3) a written record of the hearing,
containing the decision, supporting reasons and a statement of the
evidence upon which it was based. 3
This decision was an unequivocal declaration that inmates of
state penal institutions are protected by the Constitution from arbi-
trary treatment by prison administrators and that judicial restraint
and deference to decisions of prison administrators are not appropriate
when these administrative decisions infringe upon constitutionally pro-
tected freedoms. More specifically, Judge Motley's opinion offered
19. Id. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
20. A preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. See Sostre v. Rockefeller,
309 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The day after his court-ordered release, Sostre
was disciplined for "having dust on his cell bars" and on August 3, 1969, was again
punished for possessing "inflammatory racist literature." 312 F. Supp. at 869. Judge
Motley found that both punitive actions were unconstitutional, the former because
itwas taken against Sostre "in retaliation for his legal success" and the latter because
it penalized Sostre for writing and expressing his ideas.
21. 312 F. Supp. at 869-70.
22. In addition, Judge Motley held that Sostre had been treated unconstitutionally
because (1) he had been confined in punitive segregation for a period of time dis-
proportionate to the gravity of the "offenses" which he allegedly committed, contrary
to the requirements of the eighth amendment [see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910)]; (2) he had been subjected to conditions and forms of restraint which
were inconsistent with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society" [312 F. Supp. at 871, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101(1958)] ; (3) he had been punished for expressing political and religious ideas, which
punishment violated his first amendment freedom of speech as guaranteed against
state infringement by the fourteenth amendment (312 F. Supp. at 876) ; and (4) he
had been denied both a free and unencumbered access to the courts and the effective
assistance of counsel by the prison's censorship of the mail which he sent to his
attorney, which denials were in violation of the sixth amendment as protected from
state infringement by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 873.
23. 312 F. Supp. at 872, relying on U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the most expansive definition and protection of inmates' rights of any
decision ever rendered, a definition which was novel in at least three
regards. It was a fundamental extension of the protection offered in-
mates by the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment; prior to Sostre, federal courts had held unconstitutional
the placing of prisoners in various "strip" cells (which were bare and
unfurnished) or certain other places of solitary confinement, but the
conditions of confinement condemned in those cases were substantially
more barbaric than those suffered by Martin Sostre 4 It was a firm
statement that certain extensive and protective procedures must be
followed before an inmate can be subjected to serious punishment by
prison officials. 25 And it was the first time that monetary damages of
either a compensatory or a punitive nature had been awarded to an
inmate of a state penal institution for improper disciplinary treatment.2 6
The Second Circuit, in reviewing Judge Motley's decision, re-
versed in part and affirmed in part. While holding Sostre's treatment
to have been unconstitutional, the court reversed the lower court's
determination that Sostre's confinement constituted cruel and unusual
punishment27 and held that not all traditional procedural due process
protections are required at every prison disciplinary proceeding.2" The
court did, however, acknowledge that severe punishment of inmates
should only be "premised on facts rationally determined" and, in most
cases, only after the prisoner has been "confronted with the accusa-
tion, informed of the evidence against him, and afforded a reasonable
opportunity to explain his actions. '"29
24. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (the court con-
sidered an inmate's allegations that for eleven days he had been confined, naked, in a
filthy solitary confinement cell, with the windows opened wide despite sub-freezing
temperatures, and that he had been denied the use of soap, toilet paper, a toothbrush
and other hygienic implements; the court held that, if the allegations were correct,
these conditions violated the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (the court
condemned as cruel and unusual punishment the confinement of an inmate, nude, in
an inadequately lighted and ventilated cell where he was forced to sleep on a concrete
floor and was denied the means with which to maintain personal cleanliness) ; Jordan
v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (the court held unconstitutional the
confinement of an inmate in a solitary "strip" cell which was devoid of furniture
and which lacked proper lighting and ventilation; the inmate also had been denied
health articles and had been required to eat the meager prison fare provided him in
the stench and filth that surrounded him in his cell).
25. Several injunctions were issued against the defendants, the state commissioner
of corrections and the wardens of the two New York State prisons involved, including
an injunction against returning Sostre to punitive segregation for the charges previ-
ously brought and against punishing him in any other manner the result of which would
be the loss of accrued "good time" or the inability to earn "good time" without provid-
ing full procedural safeguards. In addition, the court retained jurisdiction in order to
give the defendants the opportunity to submit proposed rules and regulations govern-
ing future disciplinary charges and hearings. 312 F. Supp. at 884.
26. Inmates have, however, recovered money damages against penal officers for
negligent supervision leading to personal injury. See Note, Prisoners' Rights Under
Section 1983, 57 GEo. L.J. 1270 (1969).
27. Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 at 26-28 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971). See note
22 supra.
28. Id. at 36-37.
29. Id. at 37. The Second Circuit upheld Judge Motley's award of $25 com-
pensatory damages for each day that Sostre spent in segregation (372 days), a total
of $9,300. But the court reversed the $3,270 award of punitive damages, indicating
that the deterrent impact of a punitive award would be minimal.
1971]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. Bundy v. Cannon
In October, 1970, seventy-two inmates were transferred from the
Maryland House of Correction, a medium security institution, to the
punitive segregation quarters of the Maryland Penitentiary, a maxi-
mum security institution. 0 These inmates were transferred because
of their alleged involvement in a work stoppage which occurred at
the House of Correction during a three-day period in September and
October, 1970. The origin of this work stoppage was dissatisfaction
with medical conditions at the House of Correction and with the
punishment of a few inmates who protested the lack of medical services
to the Warden of the House of Correction. After the third day of this
non-violent work stoppage, which involved most of the inmates at the
House of Correction, correctional officials decided to transfer a large
number of inmates to the Maryland Penitentiary. Two correctional
officials, both captains of the security force at the House of Correc-
tion, were instructed to arrange for the compilation of a list of in-
mates to be transferred. The inmates whose names appeared upon
this list were conveyed to the punitive quarters of the Maryland
Penitentiary.
Within two or three days these inmates were brought before a
disciplinary board (termed by Department of Corrections officials as
an "Adjustment Committee") composed of one of the captains who
had supervised the compilation of the transfer list, a classification
supervisor at the House of Correction and a counselor at the House
of Correction. Seventeen of the seventy-two inmates were accused of
specific acts of misconduct while the other fifty-five were told by the
Adjustment Committee that they were transferred because they were
not "amenable to the program of security level of the Maryland House
of Correction." In each of these latter fifty-five cases, the same form
was duplicated with the exact same language in it. The procedures
followed at the Adjustment Committee hearings were the same in all
cases. The charge was read to the inmate or, in cases where there
were no charges, the general reason for the transfer (absence of
amenability to the security level of the House of Correction) was
read to the inmate. The inmates were then allowed to respond and a
decision was reached concerning appropriate disposition of the case.
The recommendation of the Adjustment Committee in the cases
of the seventeen inmates charged with specific acts of misconduct was
that these inmates should be indefinitely confined in the maximum se-
curity quarters of the Maryland Penitentiary, that five days of their
"good time" should be forfeited, and that the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections should deprive each prisoner of one hun-
30. Bundy v. Cannon is a class action filed by eight inmates who were transferred
from a minimum security correctional camp to the maximum security quarters of the
Maryland Penitentiary for their alleged participation in a work-stoppage at the camp
and by two inmates punished for allegedly forming an illegal prisoner group by
lengthy confinement in the maximum security quarters of the Maryland Penitentiary.
The facts related in the text are those of Adams v. Cannon. Because the process of
administrative decision-making in Adams did not differ significantly from that em-
ployed in Bundy and because of the similarity of the legal issues and the facts involved,
Adams and Bundy were consolidated for trial and decision.
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dred additional days of "good time." These recommendations were
approved by the Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary and subse-
quently, in the cases of revocation and forfeiture of "good time," by
the Commissioner's Office. The recommendations of the Adjustment
Committee in the cases of the fifty-five inmates allegedly transferred
for "amenability" reasons were that these individuals be retained in
the Maryland Penitentiary. These individuals subsequently were con-
fined in the maximum security quarters of the Penitentiary. No "good
time" was revoked or forfeited in these cases.
In none of the seventy-two cases heard by the Adjustment Com-
mittee did the inmate involved receive, prior to his hearing, notice of
charges nor was he provided with representation at the hearing or
allowed to present witnesses of his own or to cross-examine his ac-
cusers. The membership of the tribunal hearing these cases included one
who had been intimately involved in the transfer process. Finally, no
written findings of fact, summary of evidence, or conclusions of law
were made by the tribunal.3
As in the decision of the New York district court in Sostre, the
Maryland district court held that punishment imposed in this manner
did not comport with the requirements of procedural due process.
Judge Roszel C. Thomsen held specifically that these proceedings vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment because they were not preceded by
written notice of charges and because the decision-making body lacked
objectivity and impartiality in that it included one prison official who
had initiated and pressed charges of misconduct. The court went on
to find that certain suggested32 procedures for disciplinary proceed-
ings satisfy "minimum standards" of constitutionality where an in-
mate is charged with a major violation.83 The suggested procedures
would require that (1) inmates be given written notice of the charges
against them prior to a hearing; (2) a hearing be held before an
impartial tribunal in all cases which could result in the imposition of
serious punishment; (3) inmates be allowed at such a hearing to
present witnesses of their own, to cross-examine their accusers, and
to be represented by another inmate or staff member; (4) a written
report be made of the proceedings before the administrative tribunal
including a summary of the evidence, the findings of fact, and a brief
explanation of the reasons for the board's decision; (5) the determi-
nation of the disciplinary board be based on substantial evidence; and
(6) the decision of the administrative tribunal be final except in cases
where the inmate objects to the decision and takes an appeal, on the
record, to the warden of the institution.34
31. Stipulation of Fact, Bundy v. Cannon.
32. These procedures were suggested by amicus curiae in Bundy v. Cannon.
33. A major violation is one for which the warden seeks punishment in excess of
counseling, warning, reprimand, adjustment release (a form of "probation"), tem-
porary loss of one or more privileges, loss or forfeiture of not more than five days
"good time," and/or segregated confinement for a period of not more than fifteen
days. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 8-11. On May 26, 1971, shortly before this article went to press, Judge
Thomsen rendered a final opinion and order reaffirming the interim opinion and
decree. The final opinion, while granting declaratory relief, denied injunctive relief
since the Division of Correction had, subsequent to the interim decree, adopted new
policies governing the imposition of discipline. The new policies incorporated the
1971]
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Besides acknowledging that observance of these procedures would
satisfy minimal constitutional requirements, Judge Thomsen ordered
that all plaintiffs in the Bundy case be recredited with their good time
and returned to a medium- or minimum-security institution.85
II. THE TEST OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
It is in the requirement that procedural amenities be observed
that the decision of the district court in Sostre was, and the decision
in Bundy is, most important and novel. The test of the applicability
and content of procedural due process can best be termed "contextual."
The requisites of procedural due process do not exist in an inflexible
and invariable form, but instead are defined in any given case by an
ad hoc examination and analysis of several factors. "[C]onsideration
of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action.".. 6
Thus, in considering whether a hearing is constitutionally re-
quired before the government may act in a way injurious to private
interests, and in determining the content and timing of such a required
hearing, the following factors must be balanced:
(1) the nature of the particular governmental action involved;
(2) the interest of the private party which is placed in jeopardy
by that governmental action; and
(3) the interest of the government in having a summary de-
cision-making process.
While this balancing test is ultimately the appropriate standard
for determining the applicability and content of procedural due proc-
provisions of the interim decree. In its final opinion, the court stated that the in-
clusion in its interim decree of specific and detailed procedures for disciplinary hear-
ings suggested by amicus curiae in the case was premised in part upon the agreement
of the parties that the procedures were practicable and upon the consent of counsel for
the Division of Correction that those particular procedures be prescribed.
35. The order also required Department of Corrections officials to place nota-
tions in the records of plaintiffs forbidding future detrimental treatment based upon
the incidents litigated in Bundy. Id.
36. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895(1961). The Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, stated this flexible standard
for satisfying the requirements of procedural due process and listed relevant factors
to be considered in determining whether this standard has been met. See, e.g., Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ("The extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded ...is influenced by the extent to which [one] may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss' [citation omitted] and depends upon whether
the ... interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in sum-
mary adjudication."); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ("The nature
of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden
on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.") ; Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected,
the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the func-
tionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good
accomplished - these are some of the considerations that must enter into thejudicial judgment.").
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ess, it may well be that a threshold showing that governmental ac-
tion, in the nature of "adjudication,"87 threatens potential grievous
injury to a private interest will presumptively invoke the traditional
and rudimentary protections of procedural due process. Thus, in the
case of an accused who is threatened by the state with substantial
punishment following certain factual determinations, it might be initi-
ally presumed that several basic procedural standards must be ob-
served. These protections, developed to prevent arbitrary decision-
making, include prior notice of charges, a "trial type" hearing before
an impartial tribunal at which the accused is able to confront his ac-
cusers, cross-examine opposing witnesses, present evidence (includ-
ing the testimony of witnesses) and enjoy representation by counsel,
and a written decision based upon the evidence produced at the hear-
ing and containing findings of fact and reasons for the decision. 8 The
government would, of course, be entitled to rebut this presumption by
showing that the balance of factors renders some or all of these rudi-
mentary procedural protections inappropriate in the particular factual
setting.
Support for this "presumptive test" of procedural due process is
found in pronouncements of the Supreme Court that one's right to a
hearing before suffering substantial injury is implicitly recognized in
the Constitution"9 and that, to satisfy this constitutional requirement,
the hearing must be "meaningful. ' 40  Professor Davis states, "The
true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at
stake in a determination of governmental action should be entitled
to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal .
evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of
adjudicative facts, except in the rare circumstance when some other
interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding of the in-
terest in fair hearing."'41 It is submitted that judge Motley's use of
this "presumptive test" of procedural due process in the district court
opinion in Sostre was correct in that it placed upon the state the
burden of demonstrating that the failure to provide the procedures in
37. By "adjudicatory" action is meant the application of pre-existing policies or
rules to particular factual determinations. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT,
§§ 7.02-.04 (1959).
38. The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) indicated
that these are the basic components of procedural due process when no countervailing
governmental interest is presented requiring omission of one or more of these in-
gredients. Accord, Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
39. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to be heard before being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.")
Placing upon the government the burden of showing why the "basic" right to
full procedural due process is inappropriate finds support in traditional equal protec-
tion and due process arguments, which require the government to justify with "com-
pelling reasons" the abridgment of basic rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
40. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
41. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATME LAW TEXT § 7.02, at 115 (1959).
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question was not violative of due process. The state's failure to meet
this burden justified Judge Motley's decision. In Bundy the court
concluded that no proffered justification for summary decision-making
required the omission of fundamental procedural safeguards. 2
III. Sostre AND Bundy EVALUATED
A. The Traditional "Hands-Off" Approach
The traditional judicial response to inmate allegations of un-
constitutional treatment has been to withhold relief in deference to the
experience and expertise of prison administrators.48 Exemplary of
this studied noninvolvement 44 is the response of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals to an inmate assertion that he had been unfairly dis-
ciplined: "The discretion of the prison officials on matters purely of
discipline, within their powers, is not open to review. ' '45
This promiscuous judicial deference to prison administration ac-
knowledged the plenary power of penal administrators to discipline as
they saw fit. An attendant consequence of the denial of judicial review
was the reinforcement of the prison community's isolation by insulat-
ing it from public awareness; the courts' refusal to consider the valid-
ity of prisoner complaints prevented the public from acquiring knowl-
edge of prison conditions. Thus, the courts' failure to correct obvious
faults in the discipline procedure itself hindered possible reform efforts
by concerned segments of the public.
Erosion of the "hands-off" doctrine began with dicta contained
in several decisions. In Landman v. Peyton," for example, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Under our constitutional system, the payment which society exacts
for transgression of the law does not include relegating the trans-
gressor to arbitrary and capricious action. . . . [W]e cannot,
without defaulting in our obligation, fail to emphasize the im-
perative duty resting upon higher officials to insure that lower
42. The court based this conclusion, in part, upon an agreement of the parties
that the procedures adopted by the court were "practicable." Bundy v. Cannon at 6.
43. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Siegal v.
Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950); Roberts v. Peperseck, 256 F. Supp. 415(D. Md. 1966); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962).
44. The "hands-off" doctrine is not founded upon a claim by the federal courts
of a lack of jurisdiction since 28 U.S.C. § 1343 clearly authorizes federal courts to
hear claims of denial of constitutional rights and since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a
specific vehicle for obtaining redress for denials of constitutional rights which are
made under color of law. See note 15 supra. Nor is the "hands-off" doctrine based
upon the concepts of abstention or exhaustion of remedies since in almost no prison
cases does there exist a statute the interpretation of which might negate the necessity
of reaching the constitutional question and, as noted previously (see note 15 supra),
exhaustion of state remedies is not required in order for one to bring suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The doctrine is best
described as a self-imposed limit on jurisdiction based upon respect for federal-state
comity and on deference to the expertise of prison administrators.
45. Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845, 846 (10th Cir. 1964). See Douglas v. Sigler,
386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir.
1964) ("In the great mass of instances, however, the necessity for effective dis-
ciplinary controls is so impelling that judicial review of them is highly impractical
and wholly unwarranted.").
46. 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967).
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echelon custodial personnel are not permitted to arrogate to them-
selves the functions of their superiors. Where the lack of effec-
tive supervisory procedures exposes men to the capricious imposi-
tion of added punishment, due process and Eighth Amendment
questions inevitably arise.47
Subsequently, in a decision holding unconstitutional racial segre-
gation within prisons, it was stated that "it is well established that
prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights and that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
follow them into prison and protect them there from unconstitutional
action on the part of prison authorities ... .
Finally, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery,49 in holding
unconstitutional a prison regulation which prohibited one inmate from
giving legal assistance to another, stated that, while "discipline and
administration of state detention facilities are state functions ..., in
instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison facili-
ties conflict with [federal constitutional] rights, the regulations may
be invalidated."50
These statements, although made in the context of cases not in-
volving disciplinary questions, were irreconcilable with the earlier law
that prison inmates were "chattels of the state" and undermined the
principle that judicial review of disciplinary proceedings within a penal
institution was "wholly unwarranted."51  By recognizing that the
Constitution's protections extend through prison walls, these decisions
set the stage for the application of due process principles to prison
discipline.
This application initially was made in Morris v. Travisono,5" in
which inmates challenged a wide range of prison practices, including
the taking of summary disciplinary action. The court adopted, as an
47. 370 F.2d at 141.
48. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
333 (1968). Accord, Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
Similar statements were contained in Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532-33 (5th
Cir. 1968), which invalidated certain restrictive correspondence regulations:
Acceptance of the fact that incarceration, because of inherent administrative
problems, may necessitate the withdrawal of many rights and privileges does not
preclude recognition by the courts of a duty to protect the prisoner from unlawful
and onerous treatment of a nature that, of itself, adds punitive measures to those
legally meted out by the court. ... [C]onstitutional safeguards are intended to
protect the rights of all citizens, including prisoners, especially against official
conduct which is arbitrary....
(Emphasis added.) See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Fulwood
v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
49. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
50. Id. at 486. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice recognized the demise of the "hands-off" doctrine: "There
are increasing signs that the courts are ready to abandon their traditional hands-off
attitude. They have so far been particularly concerned with the procedures by which
parole and probation are revoked. But recent cases suggest that the whole correc-
tional area will be increasingly subject to judicial supervision." UNITED STATES
PREs-DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
CORECTIONS].
51. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964).
52. 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
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interim decree, newly devised standards which were approved by both
plaintiffs and defendants and retained jurisdiction for eighteen months
to evaluate their effectiveness. These rules required that the inmate
be given notice of any charges which had been made against him, that
an investigation of the charges be made by a superior officer, and that
there be an administrative determination of "guilt" before the confine-
ment of an inmate in maximum security quarters or the revocation of
"good time.""3 District court decisions in Sostre, Bundy and in other
recent cases54 have dealt with the specifics of implementing these stand-
ards. However, the Second Circuit in Sostre appears to have taken a
step backwards in this implemention process.55
B. The Nature of the Liberty at Stake
Before Sostre and Bundy can be evaluated, it is first necessary to
examine the nature and quantum of liberty which is at stake in a dis-
ciplinary proceeding. Although incarceration in a penal institution is
viewed by many merely as one facet of an inflexible dichotomy - one is
either in or out of prison - it is clear that gradations of institutional
freedom exist after the denial, by incarceration, of liberty in its "tradi-
tional" sense. These gradations are both inter- and intra-institutional.
In Maryland, for example, institutional freedom reaches its ebb at the
Maryland Penitentiary, a maximum security prison,56 and is at its
greatest extent at the various camp centers, which are marked by an
absence of walls and of maximum security devices and practices. 57
53. The standards further required that the administrative board be comprised of
personnel from the prison's custody and treatment departments and that the officer
reporting the alleged misconduct be disqualified from membership on the panel. The
inmate is entitled to representation at the hearing by a prison employee and may
present "information available to him," but he has no right to confront his accusers
or to present witnesses in his own behalf. A record of the hearing must be made and
the decision must be based upon substantial evidence. The warden may review the
record and decision but may not increase punishment or reverse a finding of innocence.
Id. at 871-74. But cf. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
54. See Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (Ist Cir. 1970) ; Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d
844 (1st Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, No. 66 Civ. 77 (N.D.N.Y., July 31, 1970);
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313
F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970). See notes 111-15 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
55. See notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text.
56. "The Maryland Penitentiary ... is little better than a place to do time with
a few positive treatment opportunities. The institution program is essentially indus-
tries-and-security oriented. The buildings are old and in poor state of maintenance.
Limited space seriously impedes planning and expansion of programs. Recreation and
general living space is inadequate, particularly when penitentiary inmates may live
for decades within this small and crowded enclosure. There is no formal vocational
training program. The development of any sophisticated plan for treatment would
be an academic exercise in view of the almost complete lack of treatment facilities."
THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM OF MARYLAND, MINORITY
REPORT TO GOVERNOR SPIRO T. AGNEW 20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MD. CORREC-
TIONAL COMM'N REP.]. Inter-institutional transfers of inmates for disciplinary reasons
are made to the Penitentiary, which serves as a prison within a penal system. Mary-
land Department of Correctional Services, Policy Memorandum No. 21-68 (Jan.
17, 1968).
57. The camp centers (five in all) are recently constructed, modern facilities
which have ample recreation areas. The vocational programs, including work-release
programs, are superior to those offered at either the Penitentiary or the House of
Correction (a medium security institution). Inmates at the camps have substantial
contact with the communities in which the camps are located, and there are oppor-
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The existence or absence of various privileges or rights hinges upon
the situs of confinement. Thus, vocational and work-release programs
are, for the most part, reserved for those in minimum security institu-
tions."' Chances for parole increase radically as an inmate progresses
through the chain of maximum-medium-minimum security institu-
tions. 9 Since the penitentiary is an institution concerned almost ex-
clusively with security, its purpose and nature are functionally distinct
from those of the minimum security penal institutions, where emphasis
is upon preparation for return to the outside world.6 ° Intra-institu-
tional liberty also exists in gradations. For example, in the Maryland
Penitentiary the degrees of incarceration range from solitary isolation,6
the most restrictive form of imprisonment, through confinement in
"maximum security" quarters,62 to the usual form of incarceration, con-
finement in the "general population."
In addition to forfeiting some or all of their institutional liberty,
inmates adjudged guilty of misconduct are denied "good time" credit,
which is a statutory device that shortens the length of time to be
tunities for inmates to spend time outside the camp centers. The purpose of these
camps is to prepare inmates for release rather than to maintain a high level of
security. MD. CORRECTIONAL COMM'N REP. 62-66.
58. See id.
59. Conversation with David Mason, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of
Parole. The fact that an inmate is confined in a minimum security institution is strong
evidence that he has adjusted well to institutionalization, a factor of critical import-
ance in assessing whether parole is appropriate. Id.
60. Prior to the decision in Bundy, the regulations governing punitive inter-
institutional transfers, although requiring the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner
of Corrections to approve all transfers, did not provide for any hearing. As a practical
matter, there was no institutionalized way for the reviewing party to challenge the
decision to transfer. The transferring institution's warden thus both made the initial
decision that a transfer was necessary and exercised a virtually unreviewable power
to effect such a transfer. See Maryland Department of Correctional Services, Ad-
ministrative Directive No. 12-70, 3-4 (June 1, 1970).
61. Confinement in isolation (known in the prison vernacular as the "hole") was,
prior to a recently published policy memorandum, for a period of up to ten days.
While so confined, an inmate is totally isolated from others in a small unfurnished
room (rather than a cell), not allowed to exercise outside the cubicle, and denied
visitation and other privileges. (This information was gathered by the author during
a tour of the Maryland Penitentiary and from discussions with the former warden
of that institution.) The new policy memorandum forbids the use of isolation cells
for routine punishment and authorizes their utilization only for a brief "cooling-off"
period. Maryland Department of Correctional Services, Administrative Directive
No. 16-70 (August 10, 1970).
62. Maximum security quarters are used for the severe punishment of inmates
who violate prison rules. Inmates so punished are locked in a single cell for twenty-
four hours a day except for brief exercise periods (ten to fifteen minutes two or three
times weekly) and weekly showers. Other denials of liberty include (1) exclusion
from standard recreational activities (movies, television viewing, etc.), (2) restriction
of library privileges, (3) refusal of permission to participate in vocational and
educational programs, (4) refusal of permission to work, (5) limitation of visitation
privileges, and (6) restriction of socialization opportunities. See Affidavit of inmate
of Maryland Penitentiary, "sentenced" to maximum security for one year, on file at
the office of the MARYLAND LAW REvIEW. There is a thirty-day time limit on the use
of this form of punitive confinement for inmates whose misconduct presented no
"serious danger and threat to the security of the institution and the inmates," but
there is only a requirement that the punishment be reviewed every thirty days in
cases of those guilty of serious infractions. Maryland Department of Correctional
Services, Administrative Directive No. 12-70 (June 1, 1970). Such confinement is
similar to that imposed upon Martin Sostre.
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served6 3 and expedites a prisoner's consideration for parole." Inso-
far as the accumulation of "good time" advances a prisoner's release
date, it can be said to represent "traditional" liberty - freedom from
incarceration.
Thus, there is a significant quantum of institutional and tradi-
tional liberty to which every inmate is entitled while incarcerated.
0 5
Disciplinary decisions directly deny both institutional liberty and
traditional liberty (when "good time" is forfeited) and result indi-
rectly in a denial of traditional liberty insofar as they are the reasons
for the postponement or refusal of parole and the inability to earn
"good time."66 It is this quantum of liberty which deserves protection
by the fourteenth amendment's requirement that liberty should not
be denied except by due process of law.
C. The Interest of the State
Prison administrators raise several arguments in response to sug-
gestions that an adversarial administrative hearing is required prior
to the imposition of punishment. They contend that summary ex parte
action is necessary in many instances to deter conduct that, in the re-
stricted atmosphere of a prison community, may explode into a large
scale disturbance or violence. The ex parte nature of these proceed-
ings is also defended on the grounds that (1) there is no "right" to
"good time" or to maximum institutional freedom; (2) the imposition
of discipline is not truly adversarial in nature but merely a component
part of the rehabilitative and therapeutic scheme of incarceration; and
(3) the requirement of an adversarial hearing prior to punishment
would greatly complicate administrative problems, result in an addi-
tional expenditure of public funds, and constitute a security risk. An
analysis of these proffered justifications follows.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 700(b)-(d) (1971) authorize five days a month
diminution of sentence for inmates "not guilty of a violation of the discipline or ...
rules" of the institution and an additional five days monthly for inmates who excel
in their employment or maintain satisfactory progress in educational and training
courses. Section 7 00(e) requires the forfeiture of that "good time" which is earned
in the month in which an inmate violates prison rules or exercises a lack of fidelity
or care in the performance of his work or in his educational and vocational training.
Section 700(e) also empowers the Department of Corrections to deduct "a portion
or all" of an inmate's "good time" as punishment for any of the above-mentioned
delinquencies.
64. An inmate is eligible for parole consideration after he has served one-fourth
of his sentence, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 122(a) (Supp. 1970), except in a limited
number of cases. For example, persons with life sentences must serve fifteen years.
Id. § 122(b). The accrual of "good time," by decreasing the length of the sentence,
advances the time for parole consideration.
65. The extent of liberty which is forfeited when "good time" is revoked can
be very substantial, resulting in years of additional confinement. See, e.g., Bundy v.
Cannon (punitive transfer of inmates from minimum security to maximum security
institution accompanied by forfeiture of "good time" of from seventy-eight days to
over one year and, in three cases, by denials of parole). See also Hirschkop & Mille-
mann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. Rlv. 795, 831 (1969).
66. Throughout this article, the focus will be on disciplinary action denying the
three most substantial quanta of institutional liberty: (1) "good time" credit, (2)
freedom from maximum security confinement within an institution, and (3) freedom
from confinement in a maximum security institution. General references to serious
disciplinary actions or substantial denials of prison liberty should be understood to
refer to deprivations of one or more of these quanta of liberty.
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1. "Good Time" and Maximum Institutional Freedom as Privi-
leges
Prison administrators are on constitutionally unsound ground
when they argue that, because "good time," parole, and other forms
of institutional freedom are bestowed upon inmates not as a matter of
constitutional right but as privileges accorded by the legislature,67procedural due process need not be observed when these freedoms are
forfeited or withdrawn. The test of whether procedural due processprotections must be given one's interest in a gratuity is not whether
that interest constitutes an established right to the gratuity but whether
one's interest in "avoiding [its] loss outweighs the governmental in-
terest in summary adjudication."6 Just as a failure to afford re-
cipients of public assistance a hearing prior to termination of benefits
cannot be justified by an argument that "public assistance benefits are
'a "privilege" and not a "right," ' "69 a failure to conform to the require-
ments of procedural due process when denying maximum institutional
freedoms may not be based solely upon their designation as "privi-
leges." Like welfare payments, tax exemptions,7" unemployment com-pensation,"' wrongful death benefits,72 the right to reside in public
housing,73 and the right to pursue a profession,74 "good time" andparole are conditional statutory entitlements. The determination of
facts triggering, directly or indirectly,7 5 the forfeiture of accrued "good
time" or the postponement or denial of parole may not be made arbi-
trarily merely because the interests involved are labelled "privileges." 6
The Second Circuit in Sostre recognized that a state "may not avoid
the rigors of due process by labeling an action which has serious
and onerous consequences as a withdrawal of a 'privilege' rather than
a 'right.' " The court went on to add that the "distinction between
67. See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 1967) ("The diminu-tion of sentence rests on legislative grace and not constitutional right.").68. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).69. Id. at 262, quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).70. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1958).71. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
72. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).73. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) ; Escalera v. New YorkCity Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).74. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) ; Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1967).75. Because the punishment of an inmate by confinement in maximum securityquarters has the consequential effect of impeding his accumulation of "good time"(since the inmate cannot work or participate in educational programs, see note 62supra), it is clear that, even if minimum security "freedom" be regarded as aprivilege, an observance of procedural due process would be required in any deter-
mination that this freedom is to be forfeited. However, an inmate's interest inminimum security confinement in and of itself should be protected by procedural dueprocess; while, as in the case of public employment, there may be no statutory rightto it, the granting of it can not be conditioned upon relinquishment of constitutional
rights. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ; Slochower
v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
76. See United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968) (apostponement of parole consideration is a denial of liberty, which liberty deservesconstitutional protection); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y.1969). But cf. Murphy v. Turner, 426 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir. 1970) (a hearing
revoking parole need not be adversarial since "parole has been recognized as agrace ...wherein clemency is awarded for humanitarian reasons").
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a 'right' and a 'privilege' - or between 'liberty' and a 'privilege' for
that matter - is nowhere more meaningless than behind prison
walls.""'
2. Disciplinary Proceedings as Therapy
Another proffered justification for denying inmates an adver-
sarial determination of guilt prior to the taking of disciplinary action
is that the injection of the adversarial process into prison disciplinary
proceedings destroys the basically therapeutic nature of those proceed-
ings.7" The premise of this argument is that the prison staff can best
determine an inmate's needs if it can function free from the pressures
of an adversarial proceeding.
A threshold criticism of this argument is that in most cases the
person imposing prison discipline is neither a psychologist nor a psy-
chiatrist nor one trained in related fields of knowledge. It is generally
the case that, as in Sostre, the warden of the institution or a multiple-
member panel of custodial personnel (those in charge of prison se-
curity) and classification personnel (counselors) determines what
disciplinary action is appropriate." Very rarely do classification per-
sonnel have extensive psychological training,"' and the educational
requirements for custodial personnel are themselves minimal.8 ' The
therapeutic model of disciplinary proceedings is, therefore, a fiction.
In addition, the punishments imposed are hardly in the nature of
therapy in any meaningful sense. Confinement under the conditions
heretofore described8 2 and extension of the length of confinement in
institutions which lack programs for rehabilitation 8  can hardly be
considered therapeutic. Indeed, the usual result of such therapy is
more frustration and despair. Penological experts recognize this: "the
routine use of severe disciplinary measures usually serves to embitter
inmates rather than deter them. . . . It is good disciplinary practice
to be cautious in the imposition of penalties which remove the possible
incentive for future good behavior. [Speaking, in the latter regard,
of the revocation of good time.] "84
77. Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038, at 32 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971).
78. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 7 CRIM. L. REP. 2430 (2d Cir. 1970) (the
initial parole consideration need not be adversarial since parole hearings are part of
the rehabilitative process) ; Alvarez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1970)(parole revocation hearing need not be adversarial since "the decision to revoke parole
is prognostic").
79. This was the case in Maryland prior to Bundy. This panel, comprised of
the assistant superintendent of treatment, a classification counselor, and a senior cor-
rectional officer, determined whether the inmate committed the infraction and, if so,
the appropriate punishment. Maryland Department of Correctional Services, Adminis-
trative Directive No. 12-70 (June 1, 1970).
80. In Maryland, as of 1967, psychiatric services in the correctional system were
virtually non-existent. MD. CORRECTIONAL COMM'N REP. 14, 20-21. Very recently, a
staff of psychologists instituted a special ten-cell therapy unit in the Maryland Peni-
tentiary which provides therapy and counseling for a small number of inmates. See
The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 7, 1970, § C, at 1.
81. In Maryland there is no educational requirement beyond that of having a
high school degree. (This information was obtained by the author as a result of a
conversation with officials of the Maryland penal system.)
82. See notes 61-62 supra.
83. See note 56 supra.




Because the corrective measure imposed is incarceration under
harsh conditions, the determination to take such a measure is one of
punishment rather than of therapy. As such, traditional adversarial
procedural protections are particularly appropriate.85
A more fundamental infirmity in the therapeutic rationale for dis-
regarding procedural safeguards at prison disciplinary proceedings is
suggested by an examination of the legal principles governing the
juvenile process and the commitment of persons to hospitals for the
mentally ill. In re Gault 6 established that the invocation of parens
patriae does not justify an arbitrary restraint of a child's liberty. The
Court in Gault rejected the contention that the good will and com-
passion of juvenile authorities were adequate substitutes for pro-
cedural safeguards: "It is of no constitutional consequence - and of
limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he is com-
mitted is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that,
however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial
school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. '8 7 Similarly, the psychia-
trist-patient relationship does not preclude judicial protection of per-
sonal liberty for mental patients. Hospitals for the mentally ill have
no license to disregard the requirements of procedural due process88
85. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) ; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967). In Specht petitioner was convicted, under a Colorado statute which provided
for a maximum sentence of ten years, of the crime of taking indecent liberties. He
was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, however, under a separate "sex offender"
statute which allowed the imposition of such a sentence if the defendant "constitutes
a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and
mentally ill." Id. at 607. This sentencing was done without a prior hearing to deter-
mine his status as a sex offender. The Supreme Court held that this procedure
violated due process since "the invocation of the Sex Offenders Act means the mak-
ing of a new charge leading to criminal punishment" and involves the litigation of
a new and "distinct issue," thus requiring the rudiments of procedural due process.
Id. at 610. It is the fact that new and distinct issues are involved in prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings that requires compliance with procedural due process.
In Mempa v. Rhay the Court held that due process required the presence
of counsel at probation revocation hearings since the time of deferred sentencing is
a critical stage in a criminal case. The analysis of the Court, that a forfeiture of
conditional liberty based upon factual determinations may not violate due process, is
applicable to the revocation of "good time" and to the imposition of punishment
which results in a denial of parole. See Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316
(4th Cir. 1969) (applying Mempa to revocation of probation where a new sentence
was not imposed) ; Hester v. Craven, 39 U.S.L.W. 2499 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 17, 1971)
(a parolee has a right to a hearing, conducted according to traditional due process,
before his sentence may be "redetermined" because of an alleged parole violation);
Goolsby v. Gagnon, 39 U.S.L.W. 2470 (E.D. Wis., Feb. 9, 1971) (a parolee is en-
titled to counsel at a parole revocation hearing). But see Earnest v. Willingham,
406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Holder v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
Tex. 1968).
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. Id. at 27.
88. See, e.g., Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; In re Lambert, 134
Cal. 626, 66 P. 851 (1901) ; Petition of Rohrer, 353 Mass. 282, 230 "N.E.2d 915 (1967).
The above cases hold unconstitutional, as not following procedural due process, ex
Parte involuntary commitment to mental institutions. See also Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (requiring, on grounds of equal protection, that full procedural
standards be observed before a state may confine a prisoner in an institution for the
insane after the expiration of his sentence) ; United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969) (requiring, again on grounds of equal protection, that
a full adversarial hearing be held before a penal inmate may be transferred to a state
institution for insane criminals).
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nor may they deny or abridge the basic rights of their patients under
the guise of therapy or treatment. This was the holding of Covington
v. Harris,9 in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the lower district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition filed by a patient who challenged his continued confinement
in maximum security quarters within a hospital for the mentally ill.
The court recognized the primary responsibility of the hospital in
making decisions affecting a patient's liberty and the narrow scope of
Judicial review of such decisions but stated that this does not detract
from the principle that "additional restrictions beyond those necessarily
entailed by hospitalization are as much in need of justification as any
other deprivations of liberty; nor does [such recognition] preclude
all judicial review of internal decisions." 9 The court explained the
need for the imposition of constitutional strictures upon even bene-
ficent or paternalistic institutions: "Not only the principle of judicial
review, but the whole scheme of American government, reflects an
institutionalized mistrust of any such unchecked and unbalanced power
over essential liberties. That mistrust does not depend on an assump-
tion of inveterate venality or incompetence on the part of men in
power, be they Presidents, legislators, administrators, judges, or
doctors." 9'
3. The Balance - Conservation of Financial and Administrative
Resources and Maintenance of Security versus Traditional and In-
stitutional Freedom
There can be no doubt that prison administrators have a deep
interest in conserving their allotted funds while at the same time main-
taining adequate security within their penal institutions. These two
legitimate interests must be considered and together weighed against
the inmate's interest in liberty before it is decided (1) whether any
adversarial administrative hearing is required to determine proper
disciplinary action and, if so, (2) what form the hearing should take
and (3) at what point the hearing should take place.
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that funda-
mental constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the interest of
administrative and fiscal efficiency. 2 Goldberg v. Kelly93 is a recent
reaffirmation of this principle. The Court recognized that the require-
ment that a hearing be held prior to any termination of public assist-
ance "doubtless involves some greater expense"94 but explained:
[T]he State is not without weapons to minimize these increased
costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources
can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre-termina-
tion hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities ...
Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt
89. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
90. Id. at 624.
91. Id. at 621.
92. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssennius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965) ; Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) ; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
93. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
94. Id. at 266.
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of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his pay-
ments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's
competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens. 5
The right to personal liberty deserves no less weight when bal-
anced against the need for conservation of state finances.9 A recent
decision of an Arkansas federal court granting sweeping relief to in-
mates of the Arkansas penal system contains an implicit recognition
that the rights of inmates may not be sacrificed to conserve state funds
and avoid administrative dislocation. Holt v. Sarver"' declared un-
constitutional virtually the entire range of institutional practices in
Arkansas prisons because of their extraordinary contamination with
brutal and arbitrary sanctions and procedures and because of the sys-
tem's total lack of rehabilitative programs. The court acknowledged
that "[i]t is obvious that money will be required to meet the constitu-
tional deficiencies of the institution,"9" but held that the cost of change
did not justify the existence of prison conditions which offered "no
legitimate rewards or incentives," but only "fear and apprehension"
and "degrading surroundings." 9
Allegations that a requirement of prior disciplinary hearings would
threaten security measures within penal institutions raise the spectre
of Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy'"° and related
cases' 0 ' and appear, upon cursory examination, to warrant concern.
The argument in this regard is twofold. First, holding a hearing
utilizes personnel and resources needed to maintain security. For
example, if inmates are given the right to confront accusers, who
are usually prison guards, then these guards must appear at hearings
instead of performing security functions. This would necessitate sig-
nificant diversion of security resources. Second, allowing inmates ad-
versarial rights will erode the traditional inmate-staff relationship by
placing inmates and staff on the same level for a brief period of time.
Neither of these contentions withstand scrutiny. The first con-
tention, that security will be immediately jeopardized, is essentially
another form of the conservation of resources argument. If additional
95. Id.
96. See Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), declaring unconstitu-
tional the classification, for criminal law purposes, in Baltimore City of children of
sixteen and seventeen years as adults when they were categorized as "juveniles"
throughout the rest of the State - the court so held despite the facts that the cost
to the State of Maryland would be measured in millions of dollars and that the
decision would result in substantial administrative confusion.
97. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
98. Id. at 383.
99. Id. at 379.
100. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court held that due process did not require that
the Navy advise an employee working on a military installation of why she was
excluded from that enclave or that it provide her with a hearing at which she could
attempt to refute the grounds for her exclusion. The interest of the government in
maintaining national security was held to outweigh the need to preserve the oppor-
tunity of one person "to work at one isolated and specific military installation." Id.
at 896. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan for a different evaluation of
the employee's interest. Id. at 901-02.
101. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d
46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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personnel are necessary to render prison discipline constitutional and
to maintain security, then they must be provided for in the budget." 2
The second contention, that further intangible injury to prison
security will result from making prior adversarial hearings manda-
tory, presumes a staff-inmate relationship that is fast becoming archaic.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminis-
tration of Justice casts severe doubt on the necessity of such a rela-
tionship when it states in its report that "the 'collaborative regime'
advocated in this volume is one which seeks to maximize the partici-
pation of the offender in decisions which concern him, one which seeks
to encourage self-respect and independence in preparing offenders for
life in the community. It is inconsistent with these goals to treat of-
fenders as if they have no rights, and are subject to the absolute au-
thority of correctional officials."' °3
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit lends some support to a rejection of the "intangible" se-
curity argument.0 4 It vacated, a lower court decision'0 5 that inmates
did not have the right at disciplinary proceedings to cross-examine op-
posing witnesses, produce witnesses of their own, or be represented by
counsel 0 0 since, in the words of the lower court, "[c]ross-examination
of a superintendent, a guard, or a fellow prisoner would .. .tend to
place the prisoner on a level with the prison official. Such equality is
not appropriate in prison. And it is hardly likely that in the prison
atmosphere discipline could be effectively maintained after an official
has been cross-examined by a prisoner.' '10 7
The First Circuit directed that the district court determine on
remand whether the punishment to be inflicted was such as to neces-
sitate strong procedural protection for the one punished and, if so, to
determine whether the procedures which were followed were suf-
ficient to satisfy the demands of due process. The court stated, "While
all the procedural safeguards provided citizens charged with a crime
102. It is questionable whether the making of significant additional expenditures
would in fact be necessary to assure procedural fairness. Indeed, the contrary might
be true. If prison disciplinary boards included as a participating member a public
citizen who lacked official ties to the penal system, prison employees would be able
to spend more time performing security and rehabilitative functions; at the same
time, procedural fairness would be better assured. Similarly, if law students were
allowed to represent inmates at disciplinary hearings, then the time and energy of
prison employees, who in accordance with the policies of the Maryland Department
of Corrections now perform this function (see note 156 infra and accompanying text)
could be conserved. In the long run, the guarantee of procedural fairness could
result in the conservation of state funds. It is the opinion of many penal experts
(see note 112 infra) that the fair and impartial treatment of inmates serves a
positive rehabilitative function which might well reduce recidivism and thus prevent
future expenditures of state funds.
103. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS 83.
104. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
105. 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969). Curiously, this decision was rendered as
the result of the receipt of an inmate letter by Chief Judge Wyzanski and without
a hearing or even a submission of pleadings and affidavits. Id. at 2.
106. The lower court did acknowledge that, prior to the imposition of serious
penalties, prison authorities should "(1) advise the prisoner of the charge of mis-
conduct, (2) inform the prisoner of the nature of the evidence against him, (3)
afford the prisoner an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and (4) reach its
determination upon the basis of substantial evidence." Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 4.
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obviously cannot and need not be provided to prison inmates charged
with violation of a prison disciplinary rule, some assurances of ele-
mental fairness are essential when substantial individual interests are
at stake."'10
8
The adoption by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and by several
states of policies which incorporate procedures requiring an adminis-
trative hearing prior to the imposition of any serious punishment'0 9
is further evidence that the requirement of procedural fairness does
not necessarily nor substantially hamper the maintenance of security
and discipline. Federal courts frequently rely upon these policies and
those of the American Correctional Association in setting standards
for disciplinary proceedings." 0
D. Sostre and Bundy Evaluated
It is the opinion of this author that the lower court in Sostre was
correct in requiring that prison disciplinary proceedings incorporate
traditional rudiments of procedural due process."' The nature of a
disciplinary proceeding is adjudicatory and the interest at stake in
1D8. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970).
109. The federal rules require that, before the revocation of "good time," a hearing
be held at which the inmate is given notice of the alleged infraction and afforded
thd opportunity to present a defense (but not witnesses). He is entitled to be repre-
sented by a prison official at the hearing and to appeal an adverse decision to the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement:
Withholding, Forfeiture, and Restoration of Good Time, No. 7400.6 (Dec. 1, 1966).
Other states provide all or some of these procedural protections. See Jacob, Prison/Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 H~Av. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 227, 242-43(1970). See note 156 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland
Department of Corrections policies as well as those of Missouri and Rhode Island.
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
110. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 575 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright v.McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863,
889 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Compare United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Education,380 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1967) with Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate
School Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1965). This deference is warranted not onlybecause of the judiciary's lack of detailed knowledge of prison conditions but alsobecause a consideration of a particular practice's conformity to the standards of pro-
cedural due process necessarily includes an inquiry into "available alternatives to
the procedure that was followed." Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Comm. v, McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion).
111. Two other recent United States district court decisions, rendered prior to
the Second Circuit opinion adhere to Judge Motley's decision in Sostre. In Wright
v. McMann, No. 66 Civ. 77 (N.D.N.Y., July 31, 1970), an inmate was summarily
punished for refusing to fill out a required form. The court held that compliance
with the requisites of procedural due process might have prevented punishment in
this case since the inmate held a good-faith belief that signing the form would waive
important rights and ordered prison officials to abide by the procedural requirements
expressed in Sostre. In Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
Judge Mansfield held that serious punishment (in this case confinement in maximum
security) should not be imposed upon inmates "until disciplinary procedures are
adopted that will meet rudimentary standards of due process ... " Id. at 1029. The
court also stated:
[Dlespite the peculiar and difficult problems inherent in prison administration,
we cannot accept defendants' contention that the essential elements of funda-
mental procedural fairness - advance notice of any serious charge and an
opportunity to present evidence before a relatively objective tribunal - must bedispensed with entirely because . . . the administrative problems would be too
burdensome. . . . Although a prisoner does not possess all of the rights of an
ordinary citizen he is still entitled to procedural due process commensurate witt
the practical problems faced in prison life.
Id. at 1028 (citations omitted).
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such a proceeding, personal liberty, is of the highest value. Neither
institutional rehabilitation programs nor the maintenance of discipline
and security are seriously threatened by the assurance of due process ;112
a governmental desire to conserve funds, while valid, must yield to
the adequate protection of fundamental constitutional rights. For
these reasons the author also expresses his complete agreement with
the decision in Bundy.13
An evaluation of the Second Circuit decision in Sostre presents
some difficulty. Initially, the court there recognized that an inmate
may not be subjected to punishment for an infraction of prison rules
except by due process of law. The court then grappled with what it
termed the "difficult question" - "what process [is] due" - which
it failed to answer." 4
If the decision can be read as merely reaffirming the principle
that severe punishment of prison inmates should only be "premised on
facts rationally determined" and, in most cases, only after a hearing
in which the prisoner is "confronted with the accusation, informed of
the evidence against him, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to
explain his actions,"" 5 it is not substantially inconsistent with the dis-
trict court's opinion in Sostre and the decision of the district court for
Maryland in Bundy. However, the court disagreed with the proposition
that "each of the procedural elements incorporated in [the lower
court's] injunction are necessary constitutional ingredients of every
proceeding resulting in serious discipline of a prisoner. "116
If the court meant to imply that the elements of procedural due
process enumerated by the lower court are necessary ingredients in
most cases resulting in serious discipline of a prisoner, the author
would acknowledge that this is a correct statement of law. However,
if it is the holding of the Second Circuit that in cases of prison dis-
cipline which do not arise in emergency situations it is still constitu-
tionally acceptable to seriously punish an inmate without guaranteeing
him the right to rudimentary procedural protections, then it would
112. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
333 (1968) (holding that no consideration of the state's interest in maintaining prison
security or discipline sustains the constitutionality of racial segregation in prisons).
Indeed, fair disciplinary procedures are of positive assistance in maintaining good
security. "Denying offenders any chance to challenge arbitrary assertions of power
by correctional officials" is inconsistent with "the need to instill [in the inmate]
respect for and willingness to cooperate with society and to help the offender assume
the role of a normal citizen," PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS 82.
113. See also Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969), which provides
persuasive authority for requiring compliance with procedural due process when
transfers between "functionally distinct" institutions are effected. In Shone a juvenile
offender was summarily transferred from a boys' training center to an adult correc-
tional center. The court held that this was contrary to due process of law, even
though there was no extension of the youth's sentence, because of the significant
denial of institutional liberty which was involved. The court stated that procedural
due process required a full adversarial hearing with representation of counsel prior
to such a transfer. To the extent that minimum security and maximum security
penal institutions are "functionally distinct" (id. at 848), the reasoning of Shone
would require an administrative hearing prior to such inter-institutional transfers.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) ; Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
114. Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 at 32 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971).
115. Id. at 37.
116. Id. at 36-37.
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appear that the decision rests on unsound ground. The premises of
the court's conclusion in this regard appear to be (1) that Goldberg
v. Kelly '17 and related decisions" 8 are distinguishable because prison
disciplinary hearings, unlike administrative decisions to terminate
welfare and evict tenants from public housing, are not adversary pro-
ceedings, do not call for the person involved to possess the degree of
legal competence required in an adversary hearing, and do not deal
with difficult questions of fact; (2) that the question of the procedure
used at a disciplinary hearing is one involving problems of expertise
and experience best resolved by prison administrators and is not one
of constitutional law; and (3) that, while an inmate should be pro-
tected from arbitrary treatment, the use of traditional procedures
(cross-examination, confrontation, and presentation of witnesses) is
not essential to achieve such protection.
It is simply illogical to conclude that prison disciplinary proceed-
ings are non-adversarial. The issue before the prison disciplinary
board is: did the inmate do what he is alleged to have done and, if so.
is it a violation of prison rules? In thus applying general prison poli-
cies - law - to a given set of facts to determine guilt, the disciplinary
panel is performing a quasi-judicial function. It is anomalous to re-
gard this quasi-judicial proceeding as "non-adversarial" while con-
cluding that proceedings which may terminate welfare payments or
evict tenants from public housing are adversarial and therefore de-
manding, in the latter cases, the complete observance of normal due
process principles. There is no reason why factual determinations of
inmate misconduct should be considered to be more easily made than de-
terminations of criminal guilt, and there is certainly no reason why
these factual determinations should be viewed as being simpler in
nature than those determinations underlying decisions to terminate
welfare assistance or to evict tenants from public housing.
As for the second premise, there can be no quarrel with the find-
ing of the Second Circuit that prison administrators are the best judges
of the procedures and techniques which most effectively serve the
goals of rehabilitation and maintenance of security. There is, how-
ever, no logical relation between the court's acknowledgement of this
accepted fact and its conclusion that prison administrators are at some
liberty to disregard traditional requirements of procedural due process
if, in their opinion, maintaining these protections would not aid in the
achievement of these penalogical goals. The constitutional guarantee
of due process is not intended to be used to help effectuate inmate
rehabilitation. It is intended to insure that arbitrary decision-making
and unwarranted punishment do not occur. Its central purpose is to
protect one's life, liberty, and property. If, as a collateral matter, the
injection of procedural due process into the practices of prison ad-
ministration becomes a valuable rehabilitative device, that is merely
a beneficial side effect. The issue of what procedures are essential to
establish due process is one of constitutional law; and the expertise
of prison administrators, while not completely irrelevant, is certainly
117. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
118. See, e.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
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not determinative. The forum for deciding constitutional questions is
the judicial forum, and the best judge of the necessary ingredients of
a quasi-judicial proceeding is a court of law.
Finally, if, as the Second Circuit concludes in Sostre, inmates are
entitled to be free from punishment imposed through arbitrary de-
cision-making, it is a virtually inescapable conclusion that it is the
traditional protections of procedural due process which should be used
to preserve this freedom, unless (as was not the case here) the protec-
tion of substantial state interests requires the omission of one or more
elements of that due process. Hundreds of years of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence have developed and tested the best techniques for dis-
covering truth and insuring objective decision-making. These techni-
ques include cross-examination, confrontation, and presentation of
witnesses. It is an empty promise to guarantee fairness while omitting
the tools necessary to accomplish that fairness. If there is no require-
ment of due process at a disciplinary hearing, then the proceeding
would simply follow this scenario: inmate Jones comes before a dis-
ciplinary panel; inmate Jones is told that he has been accused of com-
mitting a certain act of misconduct; inmate Jones is asked what "his
side of the story is"; and, in the overwhelming number of cases, in-
mate Jones is told that he is guilty.1 9 Without vehicles for discover-
ing truth and insuring objectivity, administrative proceedings become
a sham and a means for legitimizing arbitrariness.
IV. THE COMPONENTS AND TIMING OF THE REQUIRED HEARING
Once it is established that the balance of interests requires a
hearing, then well-accepted rudiments of procedural due process are
necessary to the conduct of such a hearing unless one or more elements
of that due process are held to be inappropriate because of an over-
whelming governmental interest.12' Thus, due process presumptively
requires that
(1) prior specific notice of the charges be given to the accused;
(2) the accused be entitled to present evidence, including wit-
nesses, in his behalf;
(3) the rights of confrontation and cross-examination be ex-
tended to the accused;
(4) the hearing be before an impartial tribunal;
119. This was the factual pattern of each of the underlying eighty-two cases in
Bundy v. Cannon.
120. If a hearing is required, it must be fair, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 50 (1950), and it must be conducted in a "meaningful manner." Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The function of a disciplinary hearing is to
determine "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent."
K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 7.02, at 116 (1959). After this initial deter-
mination, existing policies are applied to decide if an infraction of prison rules has
occurred and, if so, to impose appropriate punishment. Therefore, the nature of such
a hearing clearly is adjudicatory, warranting imposition of full procedural protec-
tions. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Willner v. Committee on Char-
acter & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1959).
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(5) the decision be based upon substantial evidence, be written,
and include reference to the evidence relied upon and reasons for the
decision; and
(6) the accused have the choice of representation by counsel or
counsel-substitute at the hearing. 2'
While some of these standards had been judicially imposed upon
prison disciplinary proceedings before Sostre,122 the rights to legal repre-
sentation, to present witnesses, to cross-examine opposing witnesses
and to confront accusers and the requirement that disciplinary deci-
sions be reduced to writing are given initial constitutional recognition
and protection in that case. There is substantial support for the manda-
tory inclusion at disciplinary hearings of all these components, with the
possible exception of a blanket right to representation by counsel.
A. The Right to Specific Notice of Charges and a
Written Decision
Prison rules are, in many instances, extremely vague and uncer-
tain. For example, inmates of the Maryland penal system may be
punished for having a "disrespectful" attitude2 8 and for using "vul-
gar" or "improper" langauge.2 4 Moreover, written regulations spe-
cifically designating conduct considered to be infractions of prison
rules were not, until very recently, 25 conspicuously posted or distrib-
uted to new inmates. The right to both specific notice of the charges
and a written decision containing the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the decision takes on added significance when the exact
nature of the conduct in question is either unknown or vaguely and
generally described. In such a case specific notice not only informs
the accused, perhaps for the first time, of his alleged conduct but also
serves the accused with initial notice that such conduct is considered
improper. 26 The court in Bundy invalidated the punitive transfer of
the inmates in part because of the absence of written notice, comment-
ing that "[w] ritten notice of charges in a substantial disciplinary pro-
ceeding is necessary to afford a prisoner the opportunity to prepare
121. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.02, at 115 (1959).
122. See Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo. L.J. 1270, 1288(1969) and cases cited therein. See also Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.
Mass. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (before punishment may be imposed
an inmate must be given notice of alleged misconduct, as well as an opportunity to
be heard and a decision based on substantial evidence).
123. Maryland Department of Corrections, Handbook for Inmates § 13, at 17
(1964).
124. Id. § 20, at 21.
125. In February, 1971, a handbook for inmates containing rules and regulations
governing conduct within the penal system was devised to replace one prepared in
1964 and is now being distributed. This is the first time that such notification has
occurred in the last few years. Stipulations of Fact, Bundy v. Cannon.
126. Substantive due process questions are raised when inmates are punished for
conduct that has not prior to the inmate's act been prohibited in writing [see Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v. McGinnis,
307 F. Supp. 627, 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1969)] or for conduct which is forbidden only in
vague and uncertain terms. See Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1967),
which implied that the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine would be applicable in invalidat-
ing vague prison rules. But cf. Estaban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
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a defense.' 1 27 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Sostre referred to ade-
quate notice as a "basic safeguard" the absence of which could not be
"lightly condoned. 1 28
The harm caused by the vagueness of prison regulations in de-
scribing prohibited conduct is compounded when there is no written
decision. The lack of a written decision undermines the inmate's right
to appeal his decision to higher administrative authorities and to seek
judicial review of adverse determinations since the reviewing body is
unable to appreciate, with particularity, the nature of the conduct pro-
hibited, the acts which the accused is found to have committed, and
the evidence supporting a determination of guilt. The result has been
complete deference to the decision of the lower administrative body,
an attitude which reflects the traditional "hands-off" approach of the
judiciary.
B. The Right to Confrontation and Cross-Examination
The right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses has
been accepted as being appropriate and necessary "[i]n almost every
setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact . ... '
The availability of this right has not been confined to criminal cases
(although it finds express constitutional recognition only in that con-
text)' 30 but has been guaranteed, by virtue of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, to those who have substantial interests at
127. Bundy v. Cannon at 4. Prior to the decision in Bundy, policies adopted by
the Maryland Department of Corrections recognized that some procedural safeguards
were necessary to prevent arbitrary decision-making. They required that the follow-
ing procedures be observed when inmates were accused of serious misconduct:(1) Any employee having knowledge of the violation was required to submit
a written report of the offense to his supervisor.
(2) The written report was forwarded to the classification department of
the institution (which department is responsible for the initial evaluation and classi-
fication of the inmate as well as for continuing his counseling).
(3) Within forty-eight hours of the alleged infraction, the inmate was brought
before a three-man disciplinary board (referred to as the "adjustment team" in policy
statements) for a hearing.
(4) This board, comprised of the assistant superintendent of treatment, a
classification counselor and a senior correctional officer, determined guilt and
punishment.
(5) At the hearing before the disciplinary board, the inmate was entitled to
representation by another inmate or staff member and had the opportunity to "discuss
his case."
(6) Punishment imposed could range from a warning or reprimand to the
forfeiture of an inmate's "good time" and/or the placing of the inmate in punitive
confinement.
(7) In all cases punishment imposed by the disciplinary tribunal had to be
approved by the warden or the superintendent of the institution. Maryland Department
of Correction Services, Administrative Directive No. 12-70 (June 1, 1970).
The policies did not require the making of a written report of the decision
containing findings of fact and reasons for the result. Without these, administrative
review was no more than a formality and was, therefore, an illegal delegation of
power by the "reviewer" who, because of his total unfamiliarity with the case, allowed
the only effective decision upon review to be made by the tribunal itself.
128. Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 at 47 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971).
129. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT §§ 7.02, 7.05 (1959).
130. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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stake in administrative decision-making.' 3 ' Considering the significant
quantum of personal liberty which is threatened,13 2 the quasi-criminal
nature of the disciplinary proceeding, the constructive and rehabilita-
tive effect of a fair disciplinary hearing,133 and the rather unique pres-
sures and relationships existing in prisons,3 4 it would seem that the
requirement that prison disciplinary proceedings guarantee inmates the
rights to confrontation and cross-examination is well-founded and logi-
cal, though novel. 33 This is so even though the introduction of these
practices into prison administration might erode traditional inmate-staff
relationships 13 and cause some administrative dislocation. 7 Signifi-
cant denials of liberty based upon the unchallenged testimony of a face-
less informer are simply not consistent with concepts of fundamental
fairness and traditional notions of procedural due process. For the same
reasons, and despite the same objections, inmates should be entitled to
call witnesses in their behalf at disciplinary proceedings. 3 The require-
131. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) ; Willner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
496-97 (1959) ; I.C.C. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913).
132. See notes 56-66 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 112 supra.
134. James V. Bennett, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, ex-
plained that, while prison officials control the institutions, subtle manipulations of
prison discipline can and do occur: "The prison society has its way of enforcing its
rules. Gambling, for example, is illegal in federal prisons . . . welching on a bet,
however, is a sin to be avenged by some subtle method, such as planting dope or a
knife beneath the offender's bed and tipping off an officer." J. V. BENNETT, I CHOSE
PRISON 28 (1970). Judicial recognition of the especially real possibility of misuse of
authority by prison guards is contained in Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 140(4th Cir. 1966):
Acton's classic proverb about the corrupting influence of absolute power is true
of prison guards no less than of other men. In fact, prison guards may be more
vulnerable to the corrupting influence of unchecked authority than most people.
It is well known that prisons are operated on minimum budgets and that poor
salaries and working conditions make it difficult to attract high calibre personnel.
Moreover, the "training" of the officers in methods of dealing with obstreperous
prisoners is but a euphemism in most states.
It is in order to guard against reliance upon the testimony of individuals who, as in
the examples above, "might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictive-
ness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy" that we require confrontation and cross-
examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). While it is apparent
that inmates called as witnesses at disciplinary hearings will be subject to the same
institutional pressures as those described by Bennett, this should not constitute suffi-
cient ground for denying inmates the right to produce witnesses, but should only
be a factor for the tribunal to consider in determining credibility.
135. Neither the federal rules nor the prison regulations of any state recognize
these as rights. See Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LiB. L. REv. 227, 242-44 (1970). However, James V. Bennett has stated that
the federal practice is to recognize the existence of these rights in some cases.
Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795,
834 (1969). An interim position between full recognition of an inmate's rights to
confront and cross-examine and no recognition of these rights at all is the position
expressed in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Fifth Circuit there held that a state school student could not be expelled without
being allowed an administrative hearing and that he, although not entitled to directly
confront, was entitled to know the names of adverse witnesses and the content of
their testimony as well as to personally appear and call witnesses in his own behalf.
136. See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text. It is apparent that traditional
practices and accepted relationships must yield to constitutional obligations. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1950).
137. See notes 92-99 supra and accompanying text.
138. Once again, this is not a right presently recognized by the vast majority of
state correctional systems or by the federal system. See Jacob, Prison Discipline and
Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ, RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. Rav. 227, 242-44 (1970).
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ment of full procedural protection when new findings of fact are made to
determine the appropriate sentencing of a convicted felon,' 39 and before
a person may be transferred from a juvenile to an adult penal insti-
tution,140 be expelled from a state school, 4 ' be evicted from public
housing,142 be terminated as a welfare recipient, 4 3 or be denied the
right to pursue a profession,144 casts grave doubt on the constitu-
tionality of policies and procedures of correctional systems which
neither give inmates the right to confront and cross-examine accusers
or opposing witnesses at disciplinary hearings145 nor allow inmates
the opportunity to present witnesses in their own behalf.
46
The court is Bundy held that policies which provide for presen-
tation of witnesses and cross-examination of accusers in cases where
substantial discipline may be imposed "meet minimum standards of
constitutional due process.'. 4 7  The Second Circuit, while failing to
require that these essential rights be granted at disciplinary hearings,
at least acknowledged that "an opportunity for the prisoner to reply to
charges lodged against him" is one of the "basic safeguards against
arbitrariness' 14' and concluded that "[i]n most cases it would probably
be difficult to find an inquiry minimally fair and rational unless the
the prisoner were confronted with the accusation... and afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to explain his actions.'
' 49
C. The Right to an Impartial Tribunal
It goes without argument that it is essential that an impartial
tribunal preside at any constitutionally required hearing. 50 To be
impartial a tribunal should be as nearly as possible free from interests
which conflict with its obligation to fairly and objectively find facts
and apply law. The Bundy court held that "[t]his principle is vio-
139. Specht v. Patterson. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
140. Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (lst Cir. 1969).
141. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
See note 136 supra.
142. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
143. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
144. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
145. By "opposing witnesses" it is meant not only individuals who might testify
against an individual at a disciplinary hearing but also any other person who might
have supplied evidence affecting the decision.
146. This was the case in Maryland prior to Bundy. See Maryland Department
of Corrections, Administrative Directive No. 12-70 (June 1, 1970).
147. Bundy v. Cannon at 6.
148. Sostre v. McGinnis, No. 35038 at 47 (2d Cir., Feb. 24, 1971).
149. Id. at 37. The court felt that the evidence as to whether a prisoner had
violated a prison regulation would probably be "simpler, more precise, and more
readily at hand" than evidence presented at various other types of administrative
hearings and therefore concluded that the need for allowing cross-examination and
the calling of witnesses was not as great. Id. at 34.
150. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). A recent decision, Taylor
v. New York City Transit Authority, 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), held that
a requisite component of "quasi-judicial administrative adjudications" is an impartial
tribunal. The court stated, "Confusion between the roles of judge and advocate has
been rightly distrusted in English law since the Middle Ages. With possible exceptions
not here relevant, the right to an impartial judge - one who has no interest in the
outcome of a case before him and whose contact with the litigation does not suggest
any reason for partiality - is required to meet minimum standards of due process."
Id. at 788 (citation omitted).
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lated when the same prison official assumes the dual responsibility of
(1) initiating and pressing charges of misconduct, and (2) subse-
quently determining, as a member of an administrative body, whether
misconduct has occurred and assessing appropriate punishment."''
It was this same coalescence of functions that was condemned by the
district court in Sostre.'52 While silent on this point, the Second
Circuit did compare the relationship of a warden and an inmate to
that of a parole board and a prospective parolee, commenting that this
relationship "should not be viewed as adversarial in the same sense
that a criminal trial is adversarial." This author has already expressed
his opinion that this is a naive and unrealistic appraisal of a discipli-
nary proceeding.
To assure that the tribunal is completely impartial, it would be
preferable if at least one member of the adjustment team was not an
officer or employee of the penal system. With the proliferation of
prison reform groups'53 and the increased public interest in correc-
tions, reputable citizens could probably be encouraged to assume this
responsibility. However, the decision in Bundy approving as constitu-
tionally sufficient, in cases involving substantial punishment, a discipli-
nary tribunal not containing correctional officers, but rather comprised
of an independent hearing officer, members of the treatment and coun-
seling divisions and, if available, a psychologist, chaplain or teacher,
provides assurance that the decision-maker will be impartial.
D. The Right to Retain Counsel or Counsel-Substitute
Johnson v. Avery 54 established the constitutional right of inmate
"writ-writers" to render legal assistance to fellow prisoners. The de-
cision was premised on the consideration that many inmates are illit-
erate and simply unable to adequately represent themselves, factors
which require the extension of the Johnson holding to include the
right to counsel-substitute at prison disciplinary proceedings. The
decision by the district court in Sostre establishing the right of in-
mates to be represented by "counsel or counsel-substitute"' 55 and that
151. Bundy v. Cannon at 4. Holding that an inmate of the New York penal system
had been arbitrarily denied "good time," the court in Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 307 F.
Supp. 627, 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) questioned the constitutionality of the imposition of
discipline under procedures not insuring a separation of functions, stating: "I am not
sure the disciplinary officer ... can assume legally the investigative mantle and [then]
become prosecutor, judge and jury, and .. .Appellate Court of review." Other penal
systems are sensitive to this problem. For example, the policies of Missouri and Rhode
Island explicitly exclude from membership on the disciplinary board any officer who
initiated disciplinary charges or investigated such charges. See Morris v. Travisono,
310 F. Supp. 857, 872 (D.R.I. 1970) ; Missouri State Penitentiary, Personnel Informa-
tion Pamphlet 3 (1967).
152. The punishment of Sostre was effected solely upon the decision of the
warden of Green Haven Prison. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 867-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
153. In Maryland, the Prisoners' Aid Association and the St. Johns' Council are
two of the more active groups.
154. 393 U.S. 484 (1968).
155. The representation could, in many cases, be provided by law students in
Baltimore. The Baltimore Legal Aid Bureau, in conjunction with the University of
Maryland School of Law, has for the past year supervised a group of law students
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in Bundy approving policies providing for representation by "another
inmate or a staff member" support such an application of Johnson.'5 6
The Second Circuit's apparent refusal to recognize the existence of a
right to counsel-substitute at such hearings is based, once again, upon
the court's conception of a disciplinary proceeding as being somehow
less than an adversary proceeding.
The exclusion of counsel from such proceedings could, however,
be based upon more persuasive reasoning. If such representation at
these hearings may be retained by financially able inmates, indigent in-
mates arguably are entitled to appointed counsel under an extension of
the Griffin v. Illinois'5 7 rationale. If a right to appointed counsel does
exist, it is possible that legal resources are insufficient to implement it;
one penal expert has estimated that over ninety percent of all inmates
are indigent. 58 Also troublesome in rationalizing a right to repre-
sentation at disciplinary hearings are decisions which exclude counsel
from proceedings involved in other forms of administrative decision-
making, such as hearings to determine whether parole should be re-
voked'5 9 or to determine whether students should be expelled from
public schools.' 60
One logical and practical solution would be to allow the retention
of counsel only at disciplinary hearings which concern charges of very
who render legal assistance to inmates. These law students, as well as many others,
would undoubtedly respond with enthusiasm and diligence if given the opportunity to
represent inmates at disciplinary hearings.
156. Federal prisons allow an inmate charged with misconduct to have representa-
tion by a staff employee. United States Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement: With-
holding, Forfeiture, and Restoration of Good Time, No. 7400.6 (Dec. 1, 1966). A
similar right is afforded prisoners in Missouri (in very serious cases only) and in
Rhode Island. See Missouri State Penitentiary, Personnel Information Pamphlet:
Rules and Procedures 4 (1967) ; Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 873 (D.R.I.
1970).
157. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although there is no constitutional right to appeal, if
trial transcripts are provided to those inmates who can afford them for purposes of
preparing for appeal, they cannot be denied to indigents. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (the giving of an opportunity to have retained
counsel at a hearing is likely to mean that it is necessary to allow indigents to have
appointed counsel at such hearings) ; Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1969) (if a parole board allows the use of retained counsel at a parole revocation
hearing, it is required by the equal protection clause to have counsel appointed for
those less financially fortunate). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
158. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB.
L. REv. 227, 243-44 (1970).
159. Murphy v. Turner, 426 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1970); Alvarez v. Turner, 422
F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970).
160. In Madera v. Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), Judge
Motley held that procedural due process required that a public school student be
allowed to be represented by retained counsel at a conference to determine whether
he should be suspended from school. This decision was reversed by the Second
Circuit. 386 F.2d 778 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Accord, Wasson
v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (a student has no right to representation
by retained counsel at an expulsion hearing). These cases are distinguishable from
prison disciplinary hearings in that (1) the amount of personal liberty at stake in
prison disciplinary proceedings (for example, months of additional incarceration)
is entitled to greater protection than the privilege which is lost on suspension or
expulsion from school and (2) inmates, as a class, are less able to assert and protect
their rights, lacking the sophistication of college students and the parental protection
enjoyed by younger students. See French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La.
1969) (holding that a student is entitled to representation by retained counsel at an
expulsion hearing where the balance of sophistication favored the school).
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serious misconduct while relying upon the legal community to provide
free legal assistance to indigent inmates in this limited class of cases.
This solution would be consistent with practical necessity and, by au-
thorizing retention of counsel only in proceedings threatening substan-
tial denials of liberty, would not conflict with decisions involving situa-
tions in which no constitutional right to counsel has been recognized.1 61
Goldberg v. Kelly,1 62 which authorized representation by counsel at
hearings involving rights which arguably are of less importance than
personal liberty, and Mempa v. Rhay,1' 3 which authorized representa-
tion by counsel at hearings involving a quantum of personal liberty
arguably no greater than that at stake in prison disciplinary proceedings,
are support for this solution.'
E. The Timing of the Hearing
While normally there is no question that any required adminis-
trative hearing must precede the governmental action to which it per-
tains, 6 5 in extraordinary situations summary governmental action
may precede administrative decision-making. 166  In any case where
an inmate's conduct poses a substantial and present threat to the safety
of others, immediate restrictive confinement without the benefit of a
prior hearing would be warranted. A hearing to determine the necessity
of continued restrictive confinement should be held as soon thereafter as
is possible. The revocation of "good time" or denial of parole should
always be preceded by the required disciplinary hearing since their
summary forfeiture serves no valid purpose.
By allowing the revocation of "good time" only after an ad-
ministrative hearing has been conducted and by requiring such a hear-
ing to be held within seventy-two hours of the alleged violation of
prison rules (thereby minimizing the length of the period of restrictive
confinement which an inmate may be forced to endure prior to an ad-judication of guilt), the Maryland Division of Correction policies,
adopted subsequent to Bundy, appear to have satisfactorily identified the
procedures inherent in a maintenance of due process during the period
following the alleged misconduct. 67
161. See notes 159-60 supra and accompanying text.
162. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
163. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
164. See also Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 534 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissentingfrom denial of certiorari) ; Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928) (counsel
may be retained at deportation hearing).
165. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970) ; Sniadach v. FamilyFinance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312
U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 25 (1938).
166. See F.P.C. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962) ; Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
167. Id. The Missouri policies authorize the segregation of an inmate prior to
a hearing only (1) when the reporting employee believes that the inmate's conduct
threatens disorder or injury to himself or others and a supervisor approves of con-finement or (2) when the reporting employee believes confinement is necessary to
"avoid grave assault or serious disorder." Missouri State Penitentiary, Personnel




The recognition that a substantial degree of "prison freedom"
exists and that this freedom must be protected from arbitrary abridge-
ment is, in this author's opinion, a sound application of the principles
of procedural due process and a necessary assertion of judicial au-
thority. The applicability and content of procedural due process de-
pends upon the context in which the right to due process is asserted.
Relevant factors in making this determination are (1) the interests
jeopardized by governmental action, (2) the interest of the state in
summary action, and (3) the nature of the governmental proceeding.
A consideration of these factors in the context of the administration
of prison discipline supports a decision that maintenance of procedural
due process is essential to the protection of institutional and traditional
liberty; these procedures are vital instruments in the search for truth
and are necessary vehicles for implementing the promise of basic fair-
ness. Contentions by prison administrators that this quantum of lib-
erty is a privilege and that its denial is, in some cases, therapeutic do
not insulate prison disciplinary proceedings from having to conform
to the requirements of due process. The need for conservation of
physical and administrative resources is not a legitimate justification
for a disregard of these requirements, nor does their observance sig-
nificantly compromise the security function of penal institutions. To
the extent that it does so, the substantial interest of inmates in re-
taining a maximum of institutional and traditional liberty is paramount.
Policies and practices of state correctional systems are constitu-
tionally infirm insofar as they authorize the forfeiture of "good time,"
confinement of an inmate in maximum security quarters, and punitive
inter-institutional transfers without
(1) requiring that the inmate receive written notice, in advance
of any hearing, of specified misconduct;
(2) requiring that, except in emergency situations, punitive meas-
ures be taken only after a disciplinary hearing has been held;
(3) requiring that inmates be given the opportunity at such dis-
ciplinary hearings to confront accusers, to cross-examine opposition
witnesses and to present rebuttal evidence, including the testimony of
witnesses of their own;
(4) requiring that any decision of the disciplinary board be re-
duced to writing and contain reasons therefor and a statement of the
evidence relied upon; and
(5) requiring the disqualification from participation on the dis-
ciplinary panel of any prison employee who initiated the charges
against the inmate, was responsible for investigating these charges, or
who is otherwise biased.
Judicial invalidation of procedures and practices authorizing ex
parte punishment of inmates is especially appropriate, and broad defer-
ence to the status quo in the form of the "hands-off" doctrine is par-
ticularly inappropriate, because of the inherent expertise of the ju-
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diciary in devising rules and procedures governing quasi-adjudicative
decision-making. Whatever judicial sophistication is lacking toward
the intricacies and unique problems of prison administration may be
supplied by reference to repositories of expertise, such as the federal
regulations, Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, and the standards of the Amer-
ican Correctional Association, although in the final analysis the ques-
tion is one of constitutional law which precludes complete deference
by the court to any source of expertise.
Judicial activism in this area is also warranted because of the
powerless, disenfranchised status of inmates. 168 Inmates of state penal
institutions have relied upon the federal judiciary to insure protection
of their rights because this is the only arm of the government which
is motivated by principle rather than by political necessity or expedi-
ency and which is concerned to a great degree with the protection of
liberty.
Obviously, a reform of prison administrative practices to guar-
antee the employment of procedural due process is but one step to-
ward effecting the large-scale penal reform which is so badly needed.
It is a step, however, which both insures fundamental fairness and is,
for the inmates concerned, rehabilitative. The language of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is apt:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend
on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial
to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an as-
surance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for
arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done.16 9
This feeling that justice has been done is no less important to inmates
of state penal systems. Only when disciplinary proceedings are fair
must an inmate confront his own misconduct. From this introspec-
tion hopefully would come rehabilitation. For these reasons the Sec-
ond Circuit's apparent rejection of parts of the procedural due process
model formulated by the district court in Sostre is regrettable and,
this author believes, constitutionally erroneous; the decision in BundY is
welcome and, indeed, long overdue.
168. In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub
nom., 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court explained the reasons for its assump-
tion of a more aggressive role when the rights of politically weak minorities are at
stake :
Judicial deference to [legislative] judgments is predicated in the confidence courtshave that they are just resolutions of conflicting interests. This confidence is
often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and of racial minorities areinvolved. For these groups are not always assured of a full and fair hearing
through the ordinary political processes . . . because of the abiding danger
that the power structure ... may incline to pay little heed to even the deserving
interests of a politically voiceless and invisible minority. These considerations im-pel a closer judicial surveillance and review of administrative judgments adversely
affecting racial minorities, and the poor, than would otherwise be necessary.
169. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)(concurring opinion).
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